US-China Talks at Beijing, November 27, 1974

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97. Memorandum of Conversation 1

Beijing, November 27, 1974, 3:36-5:45 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Teng Hsiao-p'ing, Vice Premier of the State Council, People's Republic of China

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SUBJECT

Europe; Japan; Middle East; South Asia; Cambodia; Energy and Food; Normalization

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offers perhaps the best possibility for a national solution. We believe that for Sihanouk to act effectively he must be in charge of a balance of forces in Cambodia, similar to Souvanna in Laos. Souvanna Phouma.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: The situation is not the same.

Secretary Kissinger: It's of a different nature. I'm just being professorial; I'm not saying it can be achieved. If Sihanouk comes back as the head of the insurgent forces, he will not last long. He will just be a figurehead. And in our analysis the insurgent forces are under Hanoi's influence. So, curiously, we think it's in Sihanouk's interest to govern with some element of—not Lon Nol—but some other forces in Phnom Penh that he can use as a balance to help him preserve his position.

To be concrete, we would be prepared to cooperate in a peace conference whose practical result would be the return of Sihanouk, the transformation of the existing structure in Phnom Penh, and the participation of the resistance forces. And then Sihanouk could have a more balanced structure to govern.

Vice Premier Teng: I'm afraid that your information is not accurate. For example, there is talk that the Cambodian war is being fought by the Vietnamese. The accurate information which I can give you is that there is not a single Vietnamese soldier fighting in Cambodia.

Secretary Kissinger: That I believe, but the supplies come from Vietnam.

Vice Premier Teng: That's why I say your information is not accurate. You have to watch out, because the information supplied to you by Lon Nol is not accurate. And then you mentioned that the United States can't abandon those it has worked with. But, come to think of it, your relation with Lon Nol is only for four years.

Secretary Kissinger: I've told you we would be prepared to see a change in the structure in Phnom Penh as part of the solution. [Teng again spits into his spittoon.]

Vice Premier Teng: On this issue, Samdech Norodom Sihanouk has made many statements, and we support his statements.

Secretary Kissinger: With great passion.

Vice Premier Teng: That's true, and you don't lack passion either.

Secretary Kissinger: We have no emotional investment. And we don't oppose Sihanouk. He'll drive many people crazy before his political life is finished. [Laughter]